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FISHING COMMUNITIES AS SPECIAL PLACES:
THE PROMISE AND PROBLEMS OF PLACE IN
CONTEMPORARY FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
Seth Macinko*

I. INTRODUCTION
A thematic focus on special strategies for protecting special areas gives
rise to several questions of a definitional nature. For example, what do we
mean by “protecting”—protection from what and for what purpose (or
even, a bit anthropocentrically, for whom)? Or, perhaps more importantly,
what do we mean by special areas? It seems to be the norm these days in
discussions of marine policy to use “special areas” as a sort of shorthand
for (special) areas deserving protection through the application of a
(special) tool known as MPAs—marine protected areas. But the whole
thing is a bit circular—MPAs are a special strategy for protecting special
areas, which are defined as areas protected by MPAs. I want to address a
different kind of special area and a different kind of protection strategy.
One meaning of special areas is special places. And the special places
I wish to address are fishing communities. Fishing communities warrant
at least some of our attention when thinking about place-based strategies
for management. In this paper, I argue that management for fishing
communities as special places has promise, but that place-based
management is thwarted by the fusion of two contemporary streams of
thought in fisheries management: conflation of interest groups and
“communities,” and the emphasis on “rights-based” fishing. In Part II, I
explore the concept of place—what I mean by place, the importance of
place to people, the contrast between place-based management when the
focus is on marine organisms as opposed to when it is on human
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communities, and the potential contribution of place-based strategies to
fisheries management in the future. Despite the promise, place-based
management faces substantial impediments and in Part III, I discuss how
the coalescing interest in “property rights” and “community-based
management”—in concert with a complementary legal ruling—impedes
broader recognition of fishing communities as special places and
experimentation with place-based management. In Part IV, I return to the
idea that place-based management holds considerable promise for the
benefit of fishing communities and the biological communities they exploit.
II. THE PLACE OF PLACE IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
Does place matter in fisheries management—do people care, and
should they care, about place? The answer to this question would appear
to be “it depends.” It depends on whether place refers to marine organisms
or to human communities. As the burgeoning literature on MPAs attests to,
place-based management is in fashion these days1—when the intended
beneficiary is the marine ecosystem. But an explicit focus on place (and
preserving place) recedes when the subject is human communities.
The differential recognition of the importance of place (to human and
non-human systems) is stark and suggests that there is a kind of human
frontier2—largely unexplored territory—when it comes to place in our
thinking about managing marine ecosystems. We simply have not explored
the importance of place to the functioning and sustainability of human
communities to the degree that we have for non-human components of
marine ecosystems.
Clearly, some MPA proponents emphasize the benefits of MPAs to
local human communities (human benefits can come from both enhanced
or recovered population of marine species and a sense of empowerment
through participatory governance structures and human capacity building),
but the principal focus of the MPA literature is on marine biological
systems. This emphasis on systems highlights the differences between how

1. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MARINE PROTECTED AREAS: TOOLS
an overview on MPAs and an expansive
(though now somewhat dated due to the continued growth of the field) bibliography.
2. I use the term “human frontier” here in a more general sense than that coined by
Harold Brookfield (a boundary, delineating acceptable from unacceptable areas of inquiry
into human activity, that is not crossed—Brookfield’s location of the frontier distinguished
types of inquiry into human activity, whereas the sense employed here is more generic,
locating the boundary between inquiry into non-human versus human ties to place). H.C.
Brookfield, Questions on the Human Frontiers of Geography, 40 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 283,
284 (1964).
FOR SUSTAINING OCEAN ECOSYSTEMS (2001), for
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we treat the human and non-human components of the marine ecosystems
we care about. For the latter, we identify special places for protection of
entire assemblages of various trophic levels across generations.
Specifically, we do not try to protect (or reward or endow) individual
organisms (e.g., we do not aim to protect specific scallops). Yet, on the
human side, modern fisheries management consists of endowing specific
individuals in the present generation. This focus on individuals holds true
even if these management measures are labeled “community-based” or “comanagement.” The substantial distinction between place-based management and what is frequently called community-based management is
discussed in detail in Part III.
By “place,” I mean physical place3—what I think most people mean by
“place” in everyday usage—and here I am restricting my focus to inhabited
places. By “place-based” management, I mean management focused, in the
first instance, on endowing places, rather than individuals, with resource
wealth. The critical distinction here is between a focus on endowing
individuals in the present generation and a focus on endowing places so as
to provide a stream of opportunity for individuals in those places into the
future. A hypothetical example may be illustrative of the distinction.
Suppose a philanthropist wishes to provide for the enhancement of reading
at the local (community) level. On the one hand, she could select some
target communities and then handsomely endow individuals (perhaps even
all residents at a specific time) with personal libraries. Alternatively, she
could (like Andrew Carnegie) endow the place directly with a public
library. One path is individual-based, while the other is place-based. We
can imagine very different trajectories of the distribution of benefits into
the future. In the fisheries realm, many policies that might ostensibly
appear to be place-based are, upon closer inspection, revealed to be focused
on the endowment of particular individuals, not places.4 Significantly,

3. Importantly, I do not mean “space.” See TIM INGOLD, Concluding Commentary, in
NEGOTIATING NATURE: CULTURE, POWER, AND ENVIRONMENTAL ARGUMENT 213 (A.
Hornborg & G. Pálsson, eds., 2000), for a trenchant commentary on the displacement of
place in favor of space in a contemporary analysis; see also TIM INGOLD, THE PERCEPTION
OF THE ENVIRONMENT 190-92 (2000).
4. The quintessential example might be the fisheries policy in Newfoundland. See
generally, HAROLD A. INNIS, THE COD FISHERIES: THE HISTORY OF AN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY (Mary Q. Innis et al. eds., rev. ed. 1954); MIRIAM WRIGHT, A FISHERY FOR
MODERN TIMES: THE STATE AND THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE NEWFOUNDLAND FISHERY,
1934-68 (2001). Another example is the Alaskan fisheries policy. See generally, RICHARD
A. COOLEY, POLITICS AND CONSERVATION: THE DECLINE OF THE ALASKA SALMON (1963);
JAMES A. CRUTCHFIELD & GIULIO PONTECORVO, THE PACIFIC SALMON FISHERIES: A STUDY
OF IRRATIONAL CONSERVATION (Henry Jarrett et al. eds., 1969). While both cases clearly
involve an interest in places, the policies in question were focused on individuals and/or
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rights-based fishing and, as I argue in Part III, contemporary interest in
community-based management and co-management aligns with the focus
on endowing individuals.
It may be useful to back up and consider the question “does place
matter?” more generically, not initially focused on the context of fisheries
management. It seems obvious that place matters, often deeply, to (many)
people. This is obvious in the rich tradition of the study of “landscapes,”5
the study of the reciprocal exchanges between humans and the natural
environment. But the richness of terrestrial landscape studies contrasts
sharply with the dearth of marine/coastal analogs.6 It is unlikely that
peoples’ attachment to place stops at the coast and this gap in the literature
seems reflective of disciplinary influences. Maritime geography exists,7 but
is clearly in the minority in a discipline predominantly devoted to studying
human/environment interactions on the thirty percent of the earth’s surface
that is dirt, not water.8 Cultural oceanography seems nonexistent. I think
it is worth crossing into the frontier, to think for a moment about the
potential benefits of place-based management for fisheries.
If fisheries management is about human objectives as much as or more
than piscatorial objectives, it seems odd to leave out of the management
program what is likely to be a significant source of human benefit and
attachment. Moreover, place seems integral to the concept of “ecosystem”
and ecosystem-based management is increasingly the focal point of new
management approaches.9 It is inconsistent to pay so much attention to the
importance of place in ecosystem-based management approaches focused

individual firms, not the endowment of specific places regardless of the presence of any
particular entities and individuals at a particular time.
5. See, e.g., Yi-Fu Tuan, Thought and Landscape: The Eye and the Mind’s Eye, in THE
INTERPRETATION OF ORDINARY LANDSCAPES 89 (D.W. Meinig ed., 1979); D.W. MEINIG,
THE INTERPRETATION OF ORDINARY LANDSCAPES (1979); LANDSCAPES: SELECTED WRITINGS
OF J.B. JACKSON 1 (Ervin H. Zube ed., 1970). Of course, human history provides more
trenchant examples of the connections between people and place than any academic musings
on landscape. Consider, for example, the testimony to the power of place that is occurring
in our time in the rebuilding and resettlement of post-Katrina New Orleans, or the tragic
consequences of displacing people from their place as represented in the story of the Aleuts
who were relocated to Southeast Alaska during World War II. See generally DEAN
KOHLOFF, WHEN THE WIND WAS A RIVER: ALEUT EVACUATION IN WORLD WAR II (1995).
6. Stilgoe’s work on what he calls “alongshore” (his term for a coastal counterpart to
“landscape”) stands out as a notable exception. JOHN R. STILGOE, ALONGSHORE 1 (1994).
7. See, e.g., BERNARD NIETSCHMANN, CARIBBEAN EDGE: THE COMING OF MODERN
TIMES TO ISOLATED PEOPLE AND WILDLIFE 1 (1979).
8. Much modern geography is lost in “space.” See Ingold, supra note 3, at 213.
9. See generally U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE
21ST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT (2004).
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primarily on the biological targets of management attention, yet so little
attention to place in terms of the human targets of management. If we
believe in ecosystems as systems with synergistic relations between human
and non-human components, then to talk of ecosystem sustainability
without taking these relationships into account is shallow. The phrase
“ecosystem and place” is redundant; an ecosystem without place is not an
ecosystem. Can we imagine using the term “sustainable” to describe a
situation in which, over the long term, the bond between people and place
is destroyed?
True place-based management provides some interesting opportunities
to aim for sustainability of human and natural communities linked by the
common medium of place. But a very real difficulty in trying to talk about
place-based management is that we know so little about it (having tried it
so rarely). There is room for much experimentation with forms of placebased management, but I think that the way forward in very general terms
is via something I have called the Community Fishing Trust concept.10 The
essence of the concept is that the wealth of the fishery represents an
endowment, and that rather than conferring this endowment on only
particular members of the present generation of the fishing industry, we
might prefer to anchor that endowment to places. Very different benefit
streams and future trajectories of these benefit streams are likely to be
associated with the two options. True place-based management might offer
a benefit stream that would appear attractive from the standpoint of current
interest in the plight of fishing communities. But, of course, that would
depend on whether those communities were thought of in place-based terms
in the first place. And therein lies a considerable challenge to communities.
It is to this subject of contemporary challenges to communities and placebased management that I now turn.
III. PLACE AS PROBLEM
A gross generalization is that the trend is toward management and
co-management communities; this trend is encouraged by private
rights-based management schemes. However, in many countries
and fishery-dependent regions, this carries the risk of further

10. Seth Macinko, In Search of Transition, Community and a New Federalism: Six
Questions to Confront on the Road Towards a National Policy on Dedicated Access
Privileges, in MANAGING OUR NATION’S FISHERIES II: FOCUS ON THE FUTURE 236, 242
(David Witherell ed., 2005). See generally, SALLY K. FAIRFAX & DANA GUENZLER,
CONSERVATION TRUSTS (2001), for an overview of the natural resource-as-endowment
concept.
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marginalizing already vulnerable place-based and occupational
communities. Hence, a counter-movement can be discerned, to
protect and build upon place-based, local-level communities. That
is what most people mean by the term “community-based fisheries
management,” even though as I have suggested, community can
have many other referents.11
The quote above underscores two important trends in contemporary
fisheries management. First, there is an emerging dichotomy between
consideration of place on the one hand and the union of rights-based and
co-management philosophies on the other. It seems clear that ideological
support for so-called rights-based fishing and for co-management, defined
as devolution of management authority to industry participants, is
coalescing.
The second trend suggested in the quotation above is a counter-intuitive
(placeless) interpretation of “community” so as to permit the first trend to
be talked about as community-based management.12 As others have noted,
there are two broad conceptual categories of communities: place-based
communities and communities of interest.13 Common sense understanding
of “community” runs with the former conception, but in contemporary
fisheries management circles, there is substantial emphasis on the
latter—communities of interest. Communities of interest are also known
by other labels such as “virtual communities” and “epistemic communities.”14 Together, the trend towards rights-based fishing and the trend
toward virtual communities are inconsistent with an emphasis on place. I

11. B.J. McCay, Community-based Approaches to the ‘Fishermen’s Problem,’ in USE
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FISHRIGHTS99
CONFERENCE 203, 204 (Ross Shotton ed., 2000).
12. I expand on this counter-intuitive construction of community in Part II. Note the
seamless interchange between co-management and community-based management in the
quotation. See Marco Antonio Quesada Alpízar, Participation and Fisheries Management
in Costa Rica: From Theory to Practice, 30 MARINE POL’Y 641, 642-44 (2006), for a
discussion of the distinctions between co-management and community-based management.
13. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SUSTAINING MARINE FISHERIES 1, 97-99
(1999); McCay, supra note 11, at 204.
14. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 13, — the volume is replete
with references to “virtual communities” but see 99-100, and McCay, supra note 11, at 204,
respectively. These appellations may be a case of the proverbial old wine in new bottles as
it is not clear why the entities referred to by these various labels are something other than
what used to be known as interest groups and coalitions of interest groups, or what Merton
long ago called social groups and social collectives. ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY
AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (9th ed. 1964).
OF
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elaborate on four impediments to place-based management of fisheries and
fishing communities in the United States in the following discussions.
A. The Ageographical Nature of Fisheries Economics
A signal characteristic of the conventional fisheries economics
literature emphasizing property rights is that it is ageographical. This
ageographichal character is a direct outgrowth of the particular obsession
with property rights that pervades the fisheries economics literature. For
over a half-century, the fisheries economics literature has resembled a
monolithic block. “From the start,”15 fisheries economics has been focused
on the alleged lack of property rights in ocean fisheries.16 If the message
has remained unchanged, the stridency of the delivery of that message has
certainly increased and shows no sign of abating. The property rights and
“rights-based fishing” literature is voluminous and growing.17 The general
subject of the property rights movement in fisheries management is not my
focus per se in the present paper. The topic is huge and I have attempted
to tackle it elsewhere.18 However, the substantial influence of fisheries
economics on contemporary possibilities for place-based management

15. Parzival Copes, A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries
Management, 62 LAND ECON. 278, 278 (1986).
16. The start of fisheries economics—in the English literature—is invariably located with
the writings of H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of the Common Property Resource:
The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 124 (1954), and the biologist Milner B. Schaefer, Some
Considerations of Population Dynamics and Economics in Relation to the Management of
the Commercial Marine Fisheries, 14 J. FISH RES. BD. CAN. 669, 669-71 (1957) [hereinafter
Schaefer, Population Dynamics]; see also Milner B. Schaefer, Biological and Economic
Aspects of the Management of Commercial Marine Fisheries, 88 TRANS. AM. FISH. SOC.
100, 102-04 (1959) [hereinafter Schaefer, Commercial Marine Fisheries]; Anthony Scott,
The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. ECON. 116, 121-24 (1955). See
generally Anthony Scott, Development of Economic Theory on Fisheries Regulation, 36 J.
FISH RES. BD. CAN. 725 (1979), for a survey of the development of the fishery economics
field.
17. See, e.g., RIGHTS BASED FISHING: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON THE SCIENTIFIC
FOUNDATIONS FOR RIGHTS BASED FISHING (Philip A. Neher et al. eds., 1989); USE OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, supra note 11; RÖGNVALDUR HANNESSON,
THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE OCEANS (2004).
18. Seth Macinko, Public or Private?: United States Commercial Fisheries Management
and the Public Trust Doctrine, Reciprocal Challenges, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 919 (1993)
[hereinafter Macinko, Public Trust]; SETH MACINKO & DANIEL W. BROMLEY, WHO OWNS
AMERICA’S FISHERIES? (2002) [hereinafter Macinko & Bromley, America’s Fisheries]; Seth
Macinko & Daniel W. Bromley, Property and Fisheries for the Twenty-First Century:
Seeking Coherence from Legal and Economic Doctrine, 28 VT. L. REV. 623 (2004)
[hereinafter Macinko & Bromley, Legal and Economic Doctrine].
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springs directly from the intense focus on rights-based fishing and it is
essential to locate a discussion of place within the broader focus on
“rights.”
First, some clarification of terms is in order. Rights-based fishing is
more properly termed property rights-based fishing, and, more properly
still, private property rights-based fishing. That is, the rights-based
literature is a celebration of alleged private property rights, not human
rights or civil rights or any other form of right human societies might
sanction.19 It would be difficult to overstate just how extreme this
celebration has become.20 The early mild references to “limited entry”21
have now been replaced by open talk of “the privatization of the oceans”22
and of privatization of entire marine ecosystems.23 It would also be
difficult to overstate how blithely accepted the property rights based
diagnosis (of what ails marine ecosystems) has become in all walks of
marine policy. Consider, for example, the following statement found in the
opening sections of the National Research Council’s (NRC) report on
Marine Protected Areas:
The failure of communities to limit use of the commons by
individuals in the cause of overall community interest and
sustainability has led to a shift in most countries to private or
government ownership of most land areas. This shift imbues
property owners with a strong incentive to protect the land and its
resources from overuse and destructive activities, thus empowering
the owners to act as stewards of the land.24

19. Another distinctive characteristic of the conventional fisheries economics literature
is that from the start, it has been conspicuously devoid of any apparent need, much less
scholarly duty, to consider what rights actually are, as viewed from the perspective of the
law and established legal scholarship. In this respect, fisheries economics is just a
particularly acute case of a phenomenon afflicting economics in general. The confusion in
the economics discipline as to what property rights are is nothing short of staggering. See
Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, The Meaning of Property Rights: Law vs. Economics,
78 LAND ECON. 317 (2002).
20. See Martin L. Weitzman, Landing Fees vs. Harvest Quotas with Uncertain Fish
Stocks, 43 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 325, 326 n.2 (2002), for a specific comment on the
extremism involved.
21. See generally LIMITED ENTRY AS A FISHERY MANAGEMENT TOOL: PROCEEDINGS OF
A NATIONAL CONFERENCE TO CONSIDER LIMITED ENTRY AS A TOOL IN FISHERY
MANAGEMENT (R. Bruce Rettig & Jay J.C. Ginter eds., 1978).
22. See HANNESON, supra note 17.
23. R. Árnason, Property Rights as a Means of Economic Organization, in USE OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, supra note 11, at 22-23.
24. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1, at 20.
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In view of this miraculous power of ownership, one wonders why there
are any conservation issues left in the terrestrial realm. What we see
here—in the ownership-promotes-stewardship thesis—is the substitution
of faith and ideology for analysis. Of direct concern for this paper, the
exultation of property rights poses distinct implications for place.
In fact, the fisheries economics literature is hostile to place. By now
the underlying theory of the Gordon-Schaefer bio-economic model is
known to most fisheries policy-makers and analysts in the United States.25
The essence of the accompanying policy prescription is removing people
and capital from a fishery:
One implication of this [theoretical] insight is that reducing the
number of fishermen and gear will usually increase the income of
those enterprises that remain by more than it will reduce the
incomes of those that are excluded. In principle, at least, a system
that transferred part of the gains from the first group to the second
could leave both of them better off than they had been, while the
rest of society would benefit from the labor and capital freed for
other useful activity.26
It is perhaps not at all surprising that some people remain skeptical
about the benefits of being liberated from their current, chosen,
employment. Questions about the places those people live follow, but
place is not a factor in the standard model as shown in the exchange below:
I wonder what the effect the share quota systems . . . [would have
on] Alaska’s coastal communities or industries?27
Well, I suppose I don’t know. To some extent, I’d like those
questions to be on the other side of the ledger. What I’m interested
in and what I think we need to focus our attention on is the
aggregate effect over the entire U.S. economy, initially ignoring

25. See Gordon, supra note 16; Schaefer, Population Dynamics, supra note 16; Schaefer,
Commercial Marine Fisheries, supra note 16; see generally SUZANNE IUDICELLO ET AL.,
FISH, MARKETS AND FISHERMEN: THE ECONOMICS OF OVERFISHING (1999), for a quick
overview; and Macinko & Bromley, America’s Fisheries, supra note 18, at 22-24, for more
details.
26. Arlon R. Tussing, Introduction to ALASKA FISHERIES POLICY 8 (Arlon. R. Tussing
et al., eds., 1972) (emphasis added).
27. D. Herrnsteen, panel discussant in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT: ISSUES AND OPTIONS, ALASKA SEA GRANT REPORT 85-2, 145 (T. Frady ed.,
1985). The panel discussant was a commercial fisherman and former Mayor of Kodiak.
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the question of how particular groups, and particular individuals
and particular regions come out.28
What we see here is an outcome that is preordained—fisheries economics
has simply ruled place out of consideration at the outset. The aggregate
versus the particular emphasized in the quote above is simply the allimportant distinction between allocation and distribution that is drilled
home to any economics student. Allocation is neutral and objective,
whereas distribution is normative and subjective:
That is not to say, of course, that there won’t be clear and
identifiable impacts on those industries and communities that
directly support the fishing industry. But, here as with intraindustry economic effects, we have an issue of income distribution,
rather than net national economic product.29
By definition, distribution involves questions of “who” and, crucial to
the present focus on place, “where.” But place is more than just relegated
to the status of a second-order issue—place is fundamentally a problem for
the smooth functioning of the economic theory on its own terms. Recall the
emphasis on “freeing” some people and capital for use elsewhere in the
national economy.
1. On “Yer” Bike: Place as Problem, Mobility as Solution
What I have called the ‘let them work elsewhere’ theory30 only works
to produce benefits for the nation as a whole (and that is what it means to
say the theory “works”) if those newly unemployed actually move on to
new employment. The issue is one of “factor mobility.” In theory, all
factors of production (including labor) should be perfectly mobile, capable
of moving in and out of productive activities on a short-term basis. Of
course, it does take time to switch machinery around but having people
develop an attachment to place is even more problematic, so much so as to
represent the only “real” problem as perceived from the vantage point of
the conventional fisheries economics canon: “The problem, if there is one,
is to redirect the flow of potential new entrants from the fishery to other
occupations.”31 When the fishery is in one location and alternate

28. R.L. Stokes, panel discussant in FRADY, supra note 27, at 145.
29. R.L. Stokes, The Economics of Management and Allocation: Experience from
Outside U.S. Fisheries Management, 127 in FRADY, supra note 27, at 139.
30. Macinko, supra note 10, at 238.
31. J.A. Crutchfield, Economic and Social Implications of the Main Policy Alternatives
for Controlling Fishing Effort, 36 J. FISH RES. BD. CAN. 742, 751 (1979).
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employment options are distant from that place, things can depart rather
substantially from theory. One solution is to attempt to enhance the
mobility of labor by relocating those liberated from their employment.
Another solution is to adopt the posture that people really just should not
live in places where labor “stickiness” is likely to be a problem (e.g.,
Newfoundland, Maine, the redwood coast of northern California, Alaska).32
But of course people do live in places where labor mobility is limited,
whether for reasons of attachment or dearth of alternatives. Indeed, many
of the places we call fishing communities are characterized by their
remoteness or relative isolation and consequent labor stickiness.
When place matters, the problem is often not how to exit a place but
rather how to remain viable in that place. Note that emphasis on mobility
in order to leave a community is precisely the inverse of a reliance on
mobility to remain in a community—now mobility plays a critical role in
the quest for in-place sustainability. Those most successful at staying in a
place are often those with the ability (i.e. mobility) to pursue a portfolio of
productive activities in the surrounding region (whether focused on
monetary remuneration or capture of subsistence resources or both).33
In many respects, fisheries economics is divorced from the world it
seeks to comment on. In the real world, the world in which management
policies are devised, distribution does matter, and place is often a critical
part of distributional concerns.34 Indeed, place-based distributional
32. Note that these are not mutually exclusive options. The (in)famous attempt to
“resettle” the populace of the fishing outports of Newfoundland arguably represents a
combination of the two. See WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 146-49. Fishery economists are not
only dismissive of place-based distributional concerns, but of distributional issues in general,
including those focused on individuals. At times, their adherence to the allocation vs.
distribution distinction can seem remarkably brazen. Commenting on the usual distributional
concerns that accompany most attempts to introduce (private) property rights into fisheries,
one of the founders of modern fisheries economics noted: “To the extent that the very young,
untrained, and handicapped find entry more difficult because of the higher capital investment
required, one can only reply that it its unwise to be poor, ignorant, or unwell—the same
restrictions on entry that apply everywhere.” Crutchfield, supra note 31, at 748.
33. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
QUOTA PROGRAM IN ALASKA AND LESSONS FOR THE WESTERN PACIFIC (1999), for a
discussion of the linkages between income, mobility, and successful subsistence harvesting.
34. And not all fisheries economists reject place and distribution:
Wealth distribution does matter . . . . Many fisheries are located in depressed regions
and it is important therefore to ensure that investment is directed at these areas. By
and large, federally directed regional policy has failed to achieve this goal . . . . The
policy debate . . . is a debate about the absolute condition of fishermen and fishing
communities.
S. Cunningham, Fishermen’s Incomes and Fisheries Management, 9 MARINE RESOURCE
ECON. 241, 250-51 (1994).
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concerns were at the root of the first changes to the national standards that
form the core of our national fisheries legislation. It is to this statutory
focus on place that I now turn.
B. The Virtual Assault on Community
The incompatibility between human attachment to specific places and
an economic theory that relies upon a high degree of factor mobility is
obvious. It is less obvious (and in fact ironic) that place should be
problematic to an interest in “community” and community-based
management. But this seemingly counter-intuitive result is precisely the
situation that exists in the United States today and it exists because of
changes to our national fisheries legislation that emphasized a place-based
conception of community.
C. The Coming of Age of “Community” in Fisheries Management: Be
Careful What You Wish For?
In 1996, the U.S. Congress reauthorized the nation’s federal fisheries
legislation—the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act (MSA—originally passed in 1976)35—via an act known as the
Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA).36 The SFA introduced a new national
standard into the MSA emphasizing consideration of impacts on fishing
communities when designing management policies. Specifically, National
Standard 8 reads:
Conservation and management measures shall, consistent with the
conservation requirements of this Act (including the prevention of
overfishing and rebuilding of overfished stocks), take into account
the importance of fishery resources to fishing communities in order
to (A) provide for the sustained participation of such communities,
and (B) to the extent practicable, minimize adverse economic
impacts on such communities.37

35. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 18011882 (2000).
36. Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 18011882 (2006)).
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(8). I have quoted from the 1996 version of the Act (P.L. 104297), not the newest reauthorization (P.L. 109-479) that introduced some additional verbiage
to the Standard. For the purposes of discussion here, the additional language is irrelevant.
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National Standard 8 was accompanied by language added to the
definitions section of the MSA that specified, “[t]he term ‘fishing
community’ means a community which is substantially dependent on or
substantially engaged in the harvest or processing of fishery resources to
meet social and economic needs, and includes fishing vessel owners,
operators, and crew and United States fish processors that are based in such
community.”38
A student of fishery management in the United States could be forgiven
for thinking that these changes to the MSA would have been greeted with
warmth, if not euphoria, by a social science community that had been
pining for a toehold in the policy process to match that occupied by
biologists and economists.39 But a funny thing happened on the way to the
celebration: many social scientists began to attack, rather than embrace, the
place-based conception of community articulated in the revised MSA.40
Whole sessions at professional academic conferences have been
devoted to critiquing the MSA definition of fishing communities.41 At
times, the attack on place is lost in the fog of post-modernism:
Does the presence of community enlarge our currently limited
imaginary relative to fisheries management to include communitybased management and community economies generally? To do
so it is imperative that we continue to reveal the presence of
community, of the other within the domain of the dominant and
trace its effects.42
Rather when the essence of community is seen as enduring and
bounded, it becomes severed from history and geography such that

38. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(17).
39. Fisheries science and management has been dominated by biologists first, economists
a distant second, and then by a small haggard group of social scientists lingering far behind.
Or, as one commentator put it: “For historical reasons, biologists are far more influential
than social scientists in fisheries management. Already beleaguered for decades by
economists demanding more influence on decision-making, fisheries biologists are now
confronted increasingly by social scientists making similar demands.” R.E. Johannes,
Foreword to FOLK MANAGEMENT IN THE WORLD’S FISHERIES: LESSONS FOR MODERN
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT xi (Christopher L. Dyer & James R. McGoodwin eds., Univ. Press
of Colorado 1994).
40. For representative critiques of the place-based notion of community in the MSA see
McCay, supra note 11; Julia Olson, Re-Placing the Space of Community: A Story of
Cultural Politics, Policies, and Fisheries Management, 78 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 247, 248
(2005); Kevin St. Martin, The Impact of “Community” on Fisheries Management in the US
Northeast, 37 GEOFORUM 169 (2006).
41. See Olson, supra note 40, at 263 n.1.
42. St. Martin, supra note 40, at 171 (citation omitted).
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the ‘outside’ is a source of endangerment. Locating community
outside modernity and inside culture is, ironically, a cultural
construction. But it is one where community and culture become
severed from the plays of power, practice and meaning that provide
grist for anthropological analyses.43
Note the hint that one aspect of the furor over the place-based
conceptualization of community in the MSA is academic disciplinary angst:
Put another way, the marginalization of anthropology in public
policy is related in part to the persistence of discourses that locate
community and culture outside modernity and rationality. The
effect of this is to undermine the critical capacity of
anthropological notions of culture to analyze power and practice,
as well as to undermine the potential that alternative spaces like
communities offer for political engagement.44
At other times, the attack seems more like a conspiracy theory, with
Alaskan fish-politicians as conspirators allegedly bent on using National
Standard 8 to their advantage in the perennial struggle between Alaska and
the Seattle-based fleet that fishes off Alaska.45 Under these accounts, the
Alaskan interest in place-based communities is at odds with, and
detrimental to, the fishing communities of the northeast.46 Belief in the
Alaska conspiracy is buttressed by the opinion of the NOAA Office of
General Counsel that National Standard 8 “was another stratagem in the
Alaska/Seattle conflict . . . [but] the new understanding of the meaning of
‘fishing communities’ has reduced the impact of Standard 8 as a tool
against factory trawlers or large fishing corporations.”47 But these accounts
involve a peculiar reading of history. First, NOAA General Counsel is
itself an actor in the Alaska/Seattle conflict. Second, Congressmen from
California and Oregon expressing concern for place-based fishing
communities in their home districts are curiously alleged to be speaking
“clearly to the conflict between Alaskan and Seattle-based fishing
interests.”48 Third, the whole Alaska versus Seattle depiction is a bit too
theatrical and simplistic, given the ample record of substantial concerns for
place-based communities on the part of congressional districts far-removed

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Olson, supra note 40, at 257.
Id. at 248.
See Olson, supra note 40, at 250-52.
See St. Martin, supra note 40, at 176-77.
Olson, supra note 40, at 264, n.5.
Id. at 252.
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from Alaska. As the NOAA General Counsel report (relied upon by
subscribers to the Alaska conspiracy theory) notes:
H.R. 39 used the term ‘local coastal communities’ in the individual
quota section (e.g., an IQ system should ‘minimize negative social
and economic impacts of the system on local coastal
communities’). While the term was not defined in H.R. 39, several
House members felt the Senate bill diluted these ‘protections.’
Cong. Miller said that S. 39 defines fishing communities ‘far too
broadly.’ Cong. Furse believed the Senate bill ‘removes
safeguards for coastal communities.’ Cong. Riggs said the Senate
bill includes under ‘fishing community’ the ‘home ports of the
distant water, corporately held, factory trawlers.’ The definition
of ‘fishing community’ in the bill reported out of the Senate
Commerce Committee was changed very little in the managers’
amendment. Instead, the understanding of the definition seems to
have evolved over the summer from the drafters’ hope that it was
the equivalent of the House’s ‘local coastal communities’ to a nearconsensus that it includes any place where vessel owners,
operators, and crew or U.S. fish processors are based. The
Washington delegation insisted on this interpretation, because they
did not want their residents disadvantaged (see Gorton’s and
Murray’s floor statements).49
The point here is that the House was heading towards an even stronger
embrace of place-based conceptualization of community, motivated by nonAlaskan members of Congress. In fact, the more that the Alaska/Seattle
schism influenced the process, the farther “community” drifted from the
strict place-based conception of community that other areas of the country
were passionately advocating.50 Moreover, the insinuation that National
Standard 8 is or was an offensive weapon is simply at odds with the plain
language of the Standard itself. National Standard 8 essentially says “if
you have two policy options that are otherwise equal, pick the one that does
the least harm to fishing communities.” In short, National Standard 8 is
defensive—not offensive.

49. NOAA Fisheries Service-National Marine Fisheries Service, 102 Definitions,
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/sfaguide/102.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
50. The reader is invited to consider the embrace of place by Congressman Miller of
California in particular. See 141 Cong. Rec. 10,242 (1995); 142 Cong. Rec. 11,440-41
(1996); 142 Cong. Rec. 1,871 (1996).
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It is striking just how dominant the emphasis on communities of
interest has become in the fisheries literature.51 Stripped of the jargon and
the conspiracy theories, the essence of the post-modernists’ critique is that
communities of interest—virtual communities—are communities too, and
that Congress erred in giving the nod to place-based communities. But the
first half of this assessment is a tautology—of course various kinds of
assemblages can be referred to as “communities” including associations of
particular people, but this fact does not mean that people do not form
special bonds with places. And all this is far from what most people mean
when they inquire, for example, about the impacts of management regimes
on “fishing communities.”52 Nor does it logically follow that Congress
erred in trying to add (not elevate or advantage) place to the statute. What
is odd about the fuss over Congress’s (weak) embrace of place is that
virtual communities—i.e., interest groups, or to be blunt, the commercial
fishing industry—have always had access to the statute and to the
management process it created. The MSA was a monumental act of
industry protectionism, and the domestic management process it created
was designed to defer to industry.53 Unlike virtual communities, placebased communities did not have access to the statute, and National
Standard 8 can only be interpreted as Congressional recognition and redress
of that lacuna.

51. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text. Even away from the heart of the fray
over the definition of “community,” it seems to be routine to emphasize virtual communities
over traditional place-based communities. See, e.g., FLAXEN D.L. CONWAY ET AL.,
OREGON’S CHANGING COASTAL FISHING COMMUNITIES 4 (J. Gilden ed., 1999).
52. Indeed, I suspect that even the proponents of the virtual community concept are
aware of the stubborn habits of custom and common sense involved here. I have witnessed
public presentations of fishery policy analyses in which in one slide analysts stress the virtual
interpretation of “fishing community” and in the next slide present summary demographic
information on place-based fishing communities—no doubt the seamless switch is made for
highly pragmatic reasons. Imagine the outcry and confusion if, during the community
impacts part of the environmental assessment presentations, the analysts started talking about
impacts on various segments and alliances within industry—many of which were no doubt
already covered in earlier portions of the assessment focused, appropriately enough, on
impacts on industry.
53. See Oran Young, The Political Economy of Fish, 10 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. J. 199
(1982) (arguing that the MSA was a protectionist act through and through, and that political
interests were designed to dominate the Regional Fishery Management Councils created
under the MSA). See also Thomas A. Okey, Membership of the Eight Regional Fishery
Management Councils in the United States: Are Special Interests Over-Represented? 27
MARINE POL’Y 193, 193 (2003) (presenting empirical evidence arguing that the fishing
industry is over- not under-represented on the Regional Fishery Management Councils
created under the MSA).
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D. The Necessary Placeless Reconstruction of “Community”
I argue that the assault on place is more than just a philosophical
difference—it is a necessary event, given alignment of contemporary
interest in both property rights-based fishing and community-based
management. What we are witnessing is a radical placeless reconstruction
of community, a reconstruction necessary for the marriage of interest in
community-based management with “rights-based” management. Place
must be displaced in order for “community” to be paired with a
conceptualization of people as atomistic maximizers with an attendant
emphasis on factor mobility. The “community” must, like the industry,
become “footloose.”54
In other words, trying to meld an economic theory that is inconsistent
with social-psychological attachment to place with an interest in sustaining
place-based communities would be like the proverbial mixing of oil and
water. Something has to give, and it would seem that it is easier to define
place out of community than it is to introduce attachment to place into neoclassical economics. In this way, the growing emphasis on virtual
communities can be seen to be consistent with, indeed supportive of, the
already substantial emphasis on property rights-based fishing. Place
recedes, while “property” and (virtual) communities advance. Thus, little
of what may be called “community-based” management is place-based,
because the label itself has been “stolen”—wrenched away from ordinary
usage. “[T]here is some early evidence that the postmodern community is
not a community at all, at least not in the sociological sense of the
term . . . . The ‘communities’ have little in common with what are called
communities elsewhere.”55 “[T]he postmodern ‘community’ is really some
other kind of social formation under the stolen label of community.”56
The placeless “reconstruction of community for the next century”57 is
now self-proclaimed, so there can be little argument about what is
happening. This reconstruction of community essentially substitutes
industry for community. When “community” becomes synonymous with

54. ROSEMARY OMMER, The Ethical Implications of Property Concepts in a Fishery, in
JUST FISH: ETHICS AND CANADIAN MARITIME FISHERIES, 117-39 (Harold Coward, Rosemary
Ommer & Tony Pitcher eds., 2000) (using the word “footloose” to describe a shift from
long-standing cultural attachments to place towards the detached, free-roving maximizer of
modern economic models).
55. DEAN MACCANNELL, EMPTY MEETING GROUNDS: THE TOURIST PAPERS 88 (1992).
56. Id. at 92. MacCannell trenchantly refers to the individuals that function in these new
post-modern social formations as “neo-nomads.” Id. at 4.
57. RICHARD B. APOSTLE ET AL., ENCLOSING THE COMMONS: INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE
QUOTAS IN THE NOVA SCOTIA FISHERY 117 (2002).
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interest group, “community-based” management becomes a euphemism for
user self-regulation.58 The literal displacement of place involved in contemporary constructions of community thus highlights a distinction
between place-based management and the current emphasis on “community-based” management.59 If community does not really mean community as used in everyday language, then community-based management
is likely to mean something different too. In the first instance, place-based
management is focused on management for a community, whereas what is
now called community-based management is focused on management by
a community. But, again, just what that “community” is, is in doubt. That
is, contemporary “community-based” management is rarely, if ever, about
management by an entire community. Rather, at least (and perhaps
particularly) in the United States it is openly focused on management of an
industry (or industry sector) by members of that industry. This seems a
long way from true management by a community let alone management for
such a community. In this world of self-regulation and industry-ascommunity, it should not be surprising that the prevailing management
schemes are characterized by endowments to individuals, not place-based
communities. But the emphasis on self-regulation carries with it an
additional implication.
E. Strange Bedfellows: The Marriage of Post-Modernism
and the Wise-Use Movement
The debate over “community” is more than just an academic exercise.
At the extreme, as noted, the focus is on user self-regulation. Thus, we are
witnessing the harnessing of post-modernism for neo-conservative ends.60

58. See McCay, supra note 11, at 211 (saying “Here I close with a note on an expanded
notion of ‘community-based management,’ which is another way of talking about selfregulation by appropriators and local-level management.”).
59. See generally S. Jentoft, The Community: A Missing Link of Fisheries Management,
24 MARINE POL’Y, 53, 53 (2000); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33; John D.
Wingard, Community Transferable Quotas: Internalizing Externalities and Minimizing
Social Impacts of Fisheries Management, 59 HUM. ORG. 48, 48-57 (2000); ROBERT S.
POMEROY & REBECCA RIVERA-GUIEB, FISHERY CO-MANAGEMENT: A PRACTICAL HANDBOOK
(2006).
60. Perhaps Olson speaks for many on the post-modern “left” when she reacts with
incredulity to the kind of analysis just suggested here: “It may be surprising that
anthropology’s methodological tendencies towards the local-level, or advocacy among
common property theorists for decentralization, could be seen equivalent to anti-federalist,
conservative ideology. It might also be easy to dismiss such misreadings as the expected
peril of interdisciplinary conversation.” Olsen, supra note 40, at 249. But this is a naïve
dismissal. One only needs to spend a few minutes “surfing” the internet sites of recent
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There is considerable irony involved in this fusion. Cooperative/
community-based management arguably started out as the darling of the
ideological left, as something that “provides an especially rich opportunity
to test and refine Marxist predictions about relations between peripheral

conferences celebrating “rights” and local control of fisheries and those of the organizations
funding such conferences to see that there is no misreading or miscommunication involved
at all. Interested readers, and anthropologists, are invited to draw their own conclusions
based on a short perusal of the following sites that tease out the connections between funding
and lots of talk about property rights and community-based management. The exercise starts
with an account of a conference in Del Mar devoted to the theme of “put[ting] fishermen in
charge.” Becky W. Evans, Conference: Put Fishermen in Charge, THE STANDARD-TIMES,
Jan. 30, 2005, at B1, available at http://www.s-t.com/daily/01-05/01-30-05/b01pe312.htm.
Then simply follow the money and the rhetoric from there. Evan’s account mentions the
involvement of the Sand County Foundation and the Alex C. Walker Foundation. The Sand
County Foundation coordinated the event. See Invitational Pamphlet for Sand County
Foundation Workshop, http://sandcounty.net/uploads/Fisheries_Invitation.pdf; James Fahn,
A Report of the Sand County Foundation’s Workshop: Emerging Strategies for Improving
Fisheries Management (2005), http://sandcounty.net/uploads/Fisheries_Report_web.pdf.
Collectively, these documents point to the Walker Foundation, the Bradley Foundation, the
Property and Environment Research Center (PERC), Environmental Defense, and the
Reason Foundation. The latter document specifically mentions a Congressional lobbying
campaign. For a chronicle of this campaign see IFQs: Building a Coalition for Individual
Fishing Quotas, http://www.ifqsforfisheries.org (last visited Nov. 2, 2007). This effort
involves a partnership between Environmental Defense, PERC, and the Reason Foundation
as prominently displayed at DONALD R. LEAL ET AL., OVERCOMING THE THREE HURDLES TO
IFQS IN THE U.S. FISHERIES: A GUIDE FOR FEDERAL POLICY MAKERS (Policy Brief no. 28),
available at http://www.reason.org/pb28.pdf, and IFQs: Building a Coalition for Individual
Fishing Quotas, About Us, http://www.ifqsforfisheries.org/about/index.php (last visited Nov.
2, 2007). The Bradley Foundation is “committed to preserving and defending the tradition
of free representative government and private enterprise that has enabled the American
nation and, in a larger sense, the entire Western world to flourish intellectually and
economically” and supports “limited, competent government.” The Lynde and Harry
Bradley Foundation, The Bradley Foundation’s Mission, http://www.bradleyfdn.org/
Foundations_Mission.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 2007). The Walker Foundation’s “mission
is to investigate the causes of economic imbalances, seek free-market solutions, protect the
free enterprise system, investigate the effect of the monetary system in fostering a sustainable
economy, and inform the public of the results.” Alex C. Walker Foundation, Our Mission,
http://walker-foundation.org/net/content/page.aspx?s=5530.0.69.5316 (last visited Nov. 2,
2007). The Reason Foundation “advances a free society by developing, applying, and
promoting libertarian principles, including individual liberty, free markets, and the rule of
law,” Reason Foundation, About Reason, http://www.reason.org/aboutreason.shtml (last
visited Nov. 2, 2007), and claims to be “the world leader in privatization.” REASON
FOUNDATION, 28 Privatization Watch 1 (2004), available at http://www.reason.org/
pw327.pdf. Whatever one’s personal political ideology, it would seem to be an empirical
fact that “anti-federalist, conservative ideology” has indeed been joined to the local control,
devolution of authority aspects of the “community-based” management rhetoric so prevalent
in fisheries these days.
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resource communities and the state, relations among more and less
powerful fishing communities, and relations between more and less powerful or wealthy individuals within one community.”61 But co-management
has now been co-opted by the ideological right in the form of the so-called
wise-use movement and its private property rights bandwagon.62
This unusual marriage of ostensible ideological opposites has
implications for conservation goals as well as for the allocation agendas it
serves. That is, the conflation of industry interest groups with community
has real consequences for both human and ecological communities.
Specifically, the possibilities for true systemic sustainability are challenged
by the redefining of community in service to “neo-liberal” economic
policies.63
F. A Constitutional Impediment (?)
The emphasis on footloose individuals inherent in the placeless
reconstruction of community is consistent with another challenge to placebased management that comes from the legal arena. Place-based
management will require careful consideration of equal protection principles under U.S. law. In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a
local-preference fishery management scheme with a ruling that at first
glance might stifle any further consideration of place-based management:
“Our decision is very much in keeping with sound policy considerations of
federalism. The business of commercial fishing must be conducted by
peripatetic entrepreneurs moving, like their quarry, without regard for state
boundary lines.”64 On closer inspection, however, the Court has not
precluded place-based management at all, but has firmly stated that all

61. EVELYN PINKERTON, Introduction to CO-OPERATIVE MANAGEMENT OF LOCAL
FISHERIES: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR IMPROVED MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
31 (Evelyn Pinkerton ed.) (1989).
62. For an example of wise-use movement literature focused on fisheries, see Donald R.
Leal, Homesteading the Oceans: The Case for Property Rights in U.S. Fisheries, PERC
POLICY SERIES, August 2000, PS-19, available at www.perc.org/publications/policyseries/
homestead.html; on the larger movement itself, see generally DAVID HELVARG, THE WAR
AGAINST THE GREENS: THE “WISE USE” MOVEMENT, THE NEW RIGHT AND ANTIENVIRONMENTAL VIOLENCE (1994). Cf. Becky Mansfield, Neoliberalism in the Oceans:
“Rationalization,” Property Rights, and the Commons Question, 35 GEOFORUM 313 (2004)
(explaining a complementary observation regarding the pairing of co-management/
community-based management with “neo-liberalism”).
63. See e.g., ANTHONY DAVIS, DIRE STRAITS: THE DILEMMAS OF A FISHERY: THE CASE
OF DIGBY NECK AND THE ISLANDS 98 (1991).
64. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265, 285 (1977).
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fishery management endeavors have to uphold equal protection principles.65
There is, however, an instructive lesson in the Court’s language that goes
beyond the boundaries of mere legal jurisprudence.
G. The Needs of Peripatetic Entrepreneurs: Capital Accumulation
Fishery management is often about the needs of business as much as
the needs of resource conservation. The Court’s dictum above suggests as
much. We see a familiar emphasis on mobility. The Court specifically
spoke of the need for fishers to follow fish across imaginary lines in the
ocean, but the language of “peripatetic entrepreneurs” invokes an image of
the atomistic profit-maximizers of economic textbooks.66 And what do
these peripatetic businessmen need? One answer, posited by some, is that
they need the opportunity to accumulate capital. In fact, capital
accumulation appears to be a canonical goal for fisheries management:
The fishing industry is highly fragmented. Fishermen consist, for
the most part, of small independent fishing vessel operators, more
than 90% of which employ less than five people. The fish
processing and distribution components likewise consist
principally of small establishments. The fragmented nature of the
industry leaves little opportunity for capital accumulation and
makes achieving coordination among various operators to develop
fisheries extremely difficult.67
Whatever their utility or disutility in terms of sustainable management,
a fervent insistence on the necessity of property rights, a placeless concept
of community, and legal emphasis on free-roving investors, combine to
make a management program ideally suited to address the capital
accumulation issue. From this standpoint, attachment to, or interest in,
place by those who are expected to move on to other employment looks like
a threat to the very foundations of business enterprise.

65. Macinko & Bromley, Legal and Economic Doctrine, supra note 18, at 655. I argue
that Douglas is a pre-modern era ruling (meaning that it is a pre-Exclusive Economic Zone
ruling) and there is a need to revisit the ruling (and the dictum) in the modern era of fisheries
management in the United States.
66. Or, one might say, “neo-nomads.” MACCANNEL, supra note 55, at 4.
67. GAO, THE US FISHING INDUSTRY: PRESENT CONDITION AND FUTURE OF MARINE
FISHERIES 119 (1976).
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H. Indigenous Exceptionalism
Ironically, the final challenge to place-based management comes in the
form of the only positive acknowledgement place-based management has
received. In reality, as noted at the outset of this paper, place matters.
Place matters to people and place matters to the idea of sustainability. But
this relationship between people and place is apparently easier to see and
understand under certain settings: “[i]t should be emphasized that the
situation in isolated communities may involve a very different assessment
of the way of life argument, particularly where there are strong cultural ties
to the industry (as in the case of many of the Indian and Eskimo fisheries
of the Pacific northwest).”68
We see here a kind of exceptionalism—certain extreme cases are the
exception to an otherwise sound rule. In this case, isolated indigenous
communities are the exception to the rule that place has no place. That this
kind of exceptionalism can serve to confirm the general rule is amply
illustrated by a unique management program targeting part of the
population referred to in the quote. The Community Development Quota
(CDQ) program for western Alaska represents a unique experiment with
place-based fishery management—communities, or associations of
communities, not individuals, are endowed with fishing privileges.69 But
the uniqueness of the CDQ program is codified in statute, its
exceptionalism guaranteed by virtue of the fact that the program is
mandated for western Alaska, but other trials of the CDQ concept
elsewhere are precluded.70 It is as if to confirm the deservedness of the
western Alaska communities involved in the program, we have said: “You
are different, place really matters to you. Therefore we will let you alone
have a place-based management scheme and thereby confirm that you are
special by virtue of the fact that you have a unique program.”
It ought to be possible to overcome such indigenous exceptionalism
without having to enter into a debate about the relative meaning of place
across cultures. That place may matter in very different ways to different

68. Crutchfield, supra note 31, at 751.
69. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 15-46 for an overview of the
CDQ program.
70. To be more precise, Congress has authorized trial of the concept in the Western
Pacific under specific conditions while mandating the eligible villages and program features
in Alaska. See 16 U.S.C. § 1855. Congress has specifically prohibited use of the concept
by the North Pacific and Western Pacific Councils outside of these conditions. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1855(i)(4). Thus, Congress has spoken with great specificity to the use of the concept in
two regions, while remaining silent on other regions. Under this construction, whether
Congress has precluded use of the concept by other Councils is, perhaps, open to question.
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cultures and on incommensurable scales does not detract from the basic
proposition that place matters within many cultures and that place-based
management could hold a wider promise than is currently acknowledged.71
IV. PLACE AS OPPORTUNITY
Place-based management faces serious but not insurmountable
obstacles. The main hurdles are ideological. We can overcome those
barriers if we choose to. As noted early in this paper, there are quite
different policy trajectories to choose from. But, we do have to decide if
place matters. Place-based management offers a direct alternative to the
placeless emphasis of prevailing policy prescriptions. We know what the
current trend towards extreme placeless property rights systems
produces—it would seem that much of the opposition to some of the
leading policy prescriptions of the day is in fact derived from place-related
concerns. That is, people are scared of “rationalization” programs precisely
because they are worried about what they will mean for, and do to, special
places that they care about.72 Pushing place further into the policy margins
is not likely to result in policies that are successful or sustainable over the
long run.
A response to these concerns over the placelessness of much past
policy seems to be emerging in the United States and that response is
protectionism—protection of fishing communities.73 But there are two
problems with the current community protection approach. First, it may be
focused on protecting virtual communities—i.e. industry—rather than
place-based communities and thereby not address place-based concerns.
Second, it involves protectionism. I have suggested that protectionism may
not be the best way forward, that protectionism tends, ultimately, to
disadvantage the very thing(s) it is ostensibly designed to advantage and
this is particularly so in the world of dynamic market economies.74
However, place-based management need not, and should not, be cast
as reactionary. There is, and must be, a difference between “protecting”

71. Would we withhold democracy, for instance, from some places in order to confirm
the perceived specialness other places?
72. On “rationalization” see Mansfield, supra note 62, at 321-22; Macinko & Bromley,
America’s Fisheries, supra note 18, at 16. On being apprehensive regarding the effects of
rationalization on fishing communities, see also 142 Cong. Rec. 1,872 (1996) (statements
appended to Rep. Miller remarks, where Grader complained that the SFA “perverts” the
conception of fishing community embraced in the House bill).
73. See, e.g., MANAGING OUR NATION’S FISHERIES, supra note 10, at 164-69
(summarizing a panel session devoted to “protecting community interests.”).
74. See Macinko, supra note 10, at 242.
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places and just not systematically disadvantaging them under a rule (and
conceptual) structure that is hostile to place. It would be foolish to try to
use any management tool to lock in present patterns (a feature of most
protectionist policies), but it does seem appropriate to ask that management
tools not inherently disadvantage places. The relationship between placebased management and individual enterprise also warrants careful
consideration. It is not axiomatic that the former precludes the latter.
Indeed, it seems clear that the way forward is to address the very real
concerns people have for place by establishing some sort of place-based
endowments. Underneath this place-based foundation, we would then
expect a myriad of virtual communities to interact and compete in the
dynamic process known as market capitalism.

